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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
COSTS AND FOR CLASS
Co-Lead and Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Class Certification and Subsequent Motion Practice.6
Preliminary Approval and Settlement Notice.15
CLASS COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IS WELL SUPPORTED .16
Class Counsel’s Lodestar Shows that the Requested Fee is Fair and Reasonable .18
Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates Are Reasonable.20
The Number of Hours Class Counsel Worked Is Reasonable .21
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Additional Considerations Relevant to Attorneys’ Fees Support the Modest Lodestar Multiplier Here .23
The Novelty and Difficulty Of The Questions Involved and the Time and Labor Required .24
The Experience, Reputation, And Ability Of The Attorneys .26
The Requested Fee is a Reasonable Percentage of the Projected Settlement Recovery .28
Class Counsel’s Recorded Costs are Reasonable .31
THE REQUESTED CLASS REPRESENTATIVE STIPENDS ARE REASONABLE .32
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Atlass v. Mercedes-Ben USA, LLCz
No. 06-cv-0366, 2007 WL 1797651 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) .20
Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc.
No. 09-1248, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38663 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2011) .32
No. 98-cv-1282, 2005 WL 1917869 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2005).19
Case No. 08-2619, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42063 (D.N.J. Apr. 29,
No. 01-cv-6539, 2004 WL 2745890 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2004) .33
Grays Harbor Adventist Christian Sch. v. Carrier Corp.
No. 05-05437, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106515 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
Hankins v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
In re AT&T Corp. Secs. Litig.
In re Cendent Corp. PRIDES Litig.
In re GMC Pickup Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig
In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Marketing & Sales Pracs
MDL No. 08-1999 (E.D. Wis., Aug. 16, 2010).21
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
In re LG/Zenith Rear Projection TV Class Action Litig.,
No. 06-5609, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13568 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2009).33
In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig
Civ. No. 07-2720, MDL No. 1914, 2010 WL 2976496 (D.N.J. July
22, 2010); 267 F.R.D. 113 (D.N.J. March 15, 2010); 257 F.R.D. 46
In re Merck & Co., Inc. Vytorin ERISA Litig
., No. 08-cv-285, 2010
WL 547613 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2010) .24, 25, 29, 30
In Re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions
In re Remeron Dir. Purchaser Antitrust Litig.
2005 WL 3008808 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005) .25
In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.
In re Safety Components Int'l Sec. Litig.
In re Schering-Plough/Merck Merger Litig.,
No. 09-CV-1099, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29121 (D.N.J. Mar. 25,
Levin v. Mercedes-Benz USA
706 F. Supp. 2d 766 (N.D. Ohio 2010) .21
Lonzisero v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., LLC
Marsikyan et al. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
569 F. Supp. 2d 448 (D.N.J. 2008) .16, 31, 33
McGee v. Cont. Tire N. America, Inc
No. 06-cv-6234, 2009 WL 539893 (D.N.J. March 04, 2009) .29
Morris v. ADT Sec. Servs.,
No. 07-cv-809 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2009) .1, 24
No. L-259207 (N.J. Sup. Ct.).1, 8, 9, 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc.
Paul, Johnson, Alton & Hunt v. Graulty
Pellegrini v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
592 F.Supp.2d 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2009) .21
Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Attorney General
Public Interest Research Group v. Windall
Russell v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
Stowers v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly
Tuteur v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) .8
Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(f) .7
Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(g)(3) .6
In connection with the proposed nationwide class action settlement
(“Settlement”) reached between Plaintiffs and Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC (“MBUSA”) resolving all claims in this matter, Class counsel submit this
uncontested motion for an award of $6,250,000 in attorneys’ fees and out-of-
pocket costs, and a $5,000 stipend for each of the named Plaintiffs.
After years of difficult and tenaciously fought litigation the parties reached a
proposed Settlement that represents an overwhelmingly positive outcome for Class
members. The proposed Settlement provides recovery to Class members matched
to the harm they suffered as a result of MBUSA’s alleged failure to advise them of
the pending obsolescence of the analog-based Tele-Aid System in their Mercedes-
Benz vehicles. This relief is a tremendous accomplishment for the Class,
particularly in light of the fact that two other cases arising from the same or similar
core facts were lost without recovery. See Morris v. Mercedes-Benz USA
, No. L-
259207 (Law Div., Bergen Co.) (summary judgment granted on facts identical to
those here); Morris v. ADT Sec. Servs.,
No. 07-cv-809 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2009)
(class certification denied and case dismissed on similar claims regarding the end
of the analog signal against the home alarm company ADT).
The proposed Settlement further provides that MBUSA will pay Class
counsel’s fees and expenses, subject to the Court’s approval, independent from the
relief provided to Class members. The parties negotiated for MBUSA to pay
$6,250,000 in combined fees and expenses entirely separately from negotiation of
Class relief, only after the substantive terms of the Settlement were agreed upon.
Indeed, the Settlement is binding even if the Court declines to award Class
counsel’s attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount requested. The same is true
of the requested stipends of $5,000 for each of the named Plaintiffs; that amount
was negotiated separately from relief to the Class, and Class relief will not be
impacted by the service awards regardless of the amount the Court awards.
The requested fees and expenses reflect Class counsel’s actual time and
costs expended in the case, enhanced by a very modest multiplier of less than 1.5
that is squarely supported by the lodestar method of calculating attorneys’ fees
under Third Circuit law. The request for stipends to the named Plaintiffs for their
service to the Class is similarly supported by Third Circuit law and the facts of this
For these reasons, and for those detailed below, Class counsel respectfully
request that the Court award the requested fees and costs in full, as well as
payment of the requested stipends to each named Plaintiff.
The Court is intimately familiar with the facts of this case and the history of
this litigation, and Class counsel will not detail those facts again here.1 A brief
Plaintiffs allege that MBUSA violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
and unjustly enriched itself by failing to adequately inform owners and lessees of
model year 2002-2006 Mercedes-Benz vehicles equipped with an analog-based
Tele Aid system of the impending obsolescence in February 2008 of analog service
(by FCC mandate). See generally
, Consolidated Class Action Complaint (DE 38).
MBUSA charged consumers $600-650, plus labor costs that averaged more than
$100, to upgrade Tele Aid systems to enable them to operate using digital signals.
As the Court is aware, MBUSA disagrees with Plaintiffs’ allegations and maintains
that it did not know when the FCC would allow wireless companies to discontinue
analog service until 2007, and that it made appropriate disclosures that reflected
the potential unavailability of analog cellular service. See
Jonathan D. Selbin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs and for Class Representative Stipends (“Selbin Decl.”) ¶ 36.
1 Class counsel reference additional facts in the following sections to the extent pertinent to the issues raised in this motion, and otherwise assume familiarity with the facts as set forth in this Court’s decisions. See In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig
., Civ. No. 07-2720, MDL No. 1914, 2010 WL 2976496 (D.N.J. July 22, 2010) (DE 165) (denying motion for reconsideration of denial of decertification); 267 F.R.D. 113 (D.N.J. March 15, 2010) (DE 151) (denial of motion for decertification); 257 F.R.D. 46 (D.N.J. 2009) (DE 105) (granting class certification).
Following several years of intensely contested litigation that involved a
motion to dismiss, extensive discovery, a successful motion for class certification,
and several unsuccessful motions and petitions by MBUSA contesting the grant of
class certification, the parties negotiated the terms of the proposed Settlement for
the Class with the help of a professional mediator, Professor Eric Green. Selbin
Decl. ¶ 40. Only after those terms were agreed upon did the parties turn to
negotiating Class counsel’s fees and stipends for the named Plaintiffs. Selbin Decl.
¶ 41. The parties reached agreement on attorneys’ fees and expenses and named
Plaintiff stipends following Court-ordered mediation before the Honorable Michael
A. Shipp, U.S.M.J. Selbin Decl. ¶ 42. Plaintiffs moved this Court for preliminary
approval of a proposed Settlement on May 3, 2011. (DE 182).
In a May 10, 2011 Order, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
proposed Settlement, ordered dissemination of Settlement Notice, and set a
briefing schedule related to the motion for final approval of the Settlement as well
as the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and named Plaintiff service
While the objection period runs until July 19, 2011, to date there have been
only two objections that mention the fee request; no Class members have objected
to the stipends. Class counsel will address all fee objections and any objections to
the stipends in their reply, once the full number and scope of objections are known.
III. CLASS COUNSEL’S WORK
As the Court is aware, MBUSA has vigorously contested each stage of these
proceedings, from an initial motion to dismiss through discovery battles, multiple
rounds of class certification briefing, and two appeals. Class counsel’s time and
efforts have been correspondingly significant. Those efforts have resulted in
multiple critical rulings in Plaintiffs’ favor, primarily with regard to class
certification. As evidenced by the length and complexity of the Court’s opinions,
the legal questions in this case are hardly clear-cut. Plaintiffs (and Class counsel)
have faced considerable risk throughout this litigation, and this pattern of hard-
fought litigation would no doubt escalate during the course of any trial and the
lead-up to trial, underscoring the significant benefits Plaintiffs’ and Class counsel’s
settlement efforts have yielded for the Class. These efforts merit approval of the
requested attorneys’ fees and expenses as well as the stipends for each of the
Initial Filings and Consolidation
Plaintiffs filed a series of independent actions throughout the United States
alleging violations of applicable consumer protection laws, breach of warranty, and
unjust enrichment. In the first-filed case, Atlass v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
07-2720 (D.N.J.), MBUSA filed a motion to dismiss, which this Court denied on
The Judicial Panel for Multi-District Litigation (“JPML”) subsequently
transferred eight other actions to this Court for coordinated pre-trial proceedings,
and one additional action was filed directly with this Court. See In re Mercedes-
Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation,
No. 07-2720, MDL No. 1914 (DE 30).2
On April 11, 2008, this Court appointed Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Girard, Gibbs LLP, and Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody &
Agnello, PC to serve as Interim Co-Lead Class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of Plaintiffs and the putative
Class. (DE 34). The Court also appointed Trujillo, Rodriguez & Richards, LLC to
serve as Interim Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel. Id
. In accordance with that Order,
Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint on May 2, 2008. (DE 38).
Class Certification and Subsequent Motion Practice
After extensive document and deposition discovery, detailed below,
Plaintiffs moved on October 6, 2008 for certification of a nationwide class. (DE
60-62). In an Opinion and Order dated April 27, 2009, the Court found that New
Jersey law applied to a nationwide class of Tele-Aid subscribers and certified a
2 The other nine actions are Pellegrini v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
No. 07-4530 (C.D. Cal.); Stowers v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
, No. 08-1215 (W.D. Wash.); Hankins v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
, No. 07-07543 (C.D. Cal.); Levin v. Mercedes-Benz USA
, No. 08-0175 (N.D. Ill.); Sen. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,
No. 07-6519 (N.D. Ill.); Marcus v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
, No. 07-6892 (N.D. Ill.); Russell v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
, No. 07-4984 (E.D.N.Y.); Tuteur
Class asserting New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment claims.
On May 11, 2009, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(f), MBUSA filed a
petition for leave to appeal the Class Certification Order. Class counsel filed an
opposition, and the Third Circuit denied that petition on June 11, 2009. (DE 111).
MBUSA next filed a motion to decertify the Class. (DE 124). Following
extensive briefing and argument, this Court denied that motion in a decision filed
on March 15, 2010. (DE 151, 152). The Court also granted certification for
v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
, No. 08-223 (E.D. Mo.); and Lonzisero v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., LLC
, Civ. No. 09-0899 (D.N.J.).
3 After subsequent submissions by the parties, the Court ultimately defined the Class as follows:
All persons or entities in the United States who purchased or leased a Mercedes-Benz vehicle equipped with an analog-only Tele Aid system after August 22, 2002, and
(1) subscribed to Tele Aid service until being informed that such service would be discontinued at the end of 2007, or
(2) purchased an upgrade to digital equipment,
(1) purchased or leased a pre-owned Mercedes-Benz vehicle in December 2006 or thereafter, or
(2) leased a Mercedes-Benz vehicle for a term that expired prior to the discontinuation of Tele Aid service.
interlocutory appeal of two narrow issues pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). After
additional briefing by the parties, the Third Circuit denied MBUSA’s petition for
leave to appeal pursuant to the Court’s section 1292(b) certification. (DE 156).
On March 29, 2010, MBUSA moved this Court for reconsideration of the denial of
decertification. (DE 154). Plaintiffs filed briefing in opposition to the motion (DE
157), and in another thorough opinion addressing class certification issues, this
Court denied MBUSA’s motion for reconsideration. (DE 165).
Research and Discovery
From the pre-filing stage through exhaustive litigation and up until
Settlement, Class counsel have conducted extensive investigation, research,
documentary discovery, and work with experts in support of their claims. The
details of this research and discovery are outlined in Plaintiffs’ settlement approval
papers, and only points relevant to this application for fees, costs and stipends are
Early Discovery Efforts
Preceding coordination and consolidation, Class counsel devoted significant
resources to client interviews and research pertaining to the applicability and effect
of FCC regulations. Selbin Decl. ¶ 13. Additionally, counsel coordinated their
early discovery with the discovery served by plaintiffs in the state-court Morris
case. Selbin Decl. ¶ 14. In particular, counsel worked with MBUSA’s counsel and
counsel to develop a protocol for the production of electronically stored
information and a deposition schedule. Selbin Decl. ¶ 14. MBUSA produced
approximately 62,000 documents, which Class counsel coded and reviewed.
Each Plaintiff responded separately to MBUSA’s 34 requests for production,
and Plaintiffs eventually produced over 7,300 pages of documents (averaging
about 520 pages of documents per Plaintiff). Selbin Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs also
separately responded to hundreds of interrogatories, many of which had discrete
subparts. Selbin Decl. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs provided detailed information regarding the
purchase of their vehicles and their experiences with Tele Aid, and each Plaintiff
reviewed and verified his or her responses. Selbin Decl. ¶ 17.
Prior to the July 8, 2008, submission of a Joint Discovery Plan (DE 45-1),
Plaintiffs served a request for production of documents and deposition notices
upon MBUSA pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) and subpoenaed documents from
the Tele-Aid service provider, ATX Group, Inc. (“ATX Group”). Selbin Decl.
¶ 18. Plaintiffs also served third party subpoenas duces tecum
upon AT&T Mobility LLC, Cellco Partnership (d/b/a Verizon
Wireless), Verizon Communications Inc., Lichtenstein + Associates, and Temic
Automotive Services of North America, Inc., which led to the production of tens of
thousands of documents that Class counsel reviewed. Selbin Decl. ¶ 19.
Plaintiffs thereafter propounded over 100 requests for admissions asking that
MBUSA authenticate the documents it produced in response to Plaintiffs’
discovery requests. Selbin Decl. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs also propounded interrogatories
seeking available subscriber and ownership data necessary for damages
calculations. Selbin Decl. ¶ 21. After months of conferring, exchanging position
letters, negotiating about data depositions (one of which was taken), and otherwise
working to identify and obtain data regarding Class members, Plaintiffs ultimately
obtained all of the data needed to calculate damages. Selbin Decl. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs
were therefore able to generate an additional expert report and the final Class-wide
damages figures necessary for trial. Selbin Decl. ¶ 22.
In August 2009, MBUSA sought responses to contention interrogatories,
and the parties engaged in a vigorous meet and confer about the scope and timing
of MBUSA’s contention discovery. Selbin Decl. ¶ 23. Plaintiffs ultimately
provided specific document citations for each of their factual contentions, as well
as a list of all “communications-related technology” Plaintiffs had owned over a
In December 2009, MBUSA propounded 248 requests for admissions, which
required Class counsel to verify the existence of 79 articles and public filings
relating generally to the analog to digital transition. Selbin Decl. ¶ 24. Class
counsel located and reviewed the articles and provided responses in early 2010.
Class counsel deposed ten MBUSA employees, three employees of ATX
Group, and three MBUSA experts, including former FCC Commissioner Kathleen
Quinn Abernathy. Selbin Decl. ¶ 25. MBUSA deposed 13 Class representatives,
one non-MDL Plaintiff, and each of Plaintiffs’ three experts. Selbin Decl. ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs retained and relied upon the reports of three experts -- Dr. Warren
J. Keegan, Mr. Edmond J. Thomas, and Dr. Russell L. Lamb. Selbin Decl. ¶ 27.
Class counsel assisted with the preparation of the reports authored by Plaintiffs’
experts, prepared the witnesses for deposition, and defended the witnesses at their
depositions. Selbin Decl. ¶ 28. In addition, Dr. Lamb provided a subsequent
report that contained detailed damage calculations. Selbin Decl. ¶ 29. Class
counsel also carefully examined each of the three extensive opinions offered by
MBUSA’s three experts and deposed each of MBUSA’s experts. Selbin Decl.
Class counsel devoted significant attention to discovery regarding Class
Notice, particularly the effort to gain access to mailing lists of Tele Aid
subscribers. Selbin Decl. ¶ 31. Class counsel also negotiated the content of Class
Notice with MBUSA, which required additional briefing before the Court. Selbin
Plaintiffs ultimately mailed Class Notice to 117,625 Class members after
obtaining Court orders regarding the Class definition and Class counsel’s efforts to
obtain complete data on Class members. Selbin Decl. ¶ 33. Counsel also worked
with the class notice administrator to process and update mailing data and design a
The parties engaged in arms-length and in-person negotiations before
Professor Eric Green on October 25, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Selbin Decl.
¶ 40. At the conclusion of the November 18, 2010 mediation, the parties reached
an agreement in principle concerning the material terms of a settlement for the
Class, leaving the issues of attorneys’ fees and expenses and stipends for the
named Plaintiffs to be negotiated at a later time. Selbin Decl. ¶ 41. Following
Court-ordered mediation before the Honorable Michael A. Shipp, U.S.M.J., the
parties reached agreement on attorneys’ fees and costs, and stipends for the
The Proposed Settlement
Plaintiffs maintain that the claims asserted are meritorious, that maintenance
of class certification would prove successful, and that Plaintiffs would prevail if
this matter proceeded to trial. Selbin Decl. ¶ 35. MBUSA maintains that
Plaintiffs’ claims are unfounded and cannot be maintained as a class action, denies
any potential liability, and has shown a willingness to litigate those claims
vigorously. Selbin Decl. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs have concluded that the benefits of
settlement in this case outweigh the risks attendant to litigation, which include, but
are not limited to, the time and expenses associated with proceeding to trial, the
time and expenses associated with appellate review, and the countless uncertainties
The full terms of the relief to the Class under the Settlement are set forth in
the Settlement itself and detailed in the settlement approval papers. They can be
(1) Class members who paid out-of-pocket for a digital Tele-Aid
upgrade will automatically receive relief without the need to file a claim. These
Class members will have the option of cashing a $650 check or using a New
Vehicle Certificate as a $1,300 credit toward the purchase or lease of a new
Mercedes-Benz vehicle from an authorized Mercedes-Benz dealer;
(2) Class members who still own or lease their Mercedes-Benz
vehicles but did not purchase the digital upgrade are entitled to obtain a free
upgrade to digital Tele Aid (but must pay for the dealer labor), or a $750 credit
toward the purchase or lease of a new Mercedes-Benz vehicle from an authorized
(3) Class members who no longer own their Mercedes-Benz vehicle
and did not purchase the digital upgrade will be entitled to a $750 credit toward the
purchase or lease of a new Mercedes-Benz vehicle from an authorized Mercedes-
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses
Subject to Court approval, MBUSA will pay Class counsel $6.25 million in
combined attorneys’ fees and expenses. Agreement ¶ 89 (DE 182-2). The parties
negotiated and reached agreement regarding attorneys’ fees only after reaching
agreement on all other material terms of the Settlement, and payment of attorneys’
fees and expenses is separate from and in addition to the other relief afforded to
Class members under the Settlement. No Class member’s recovery is reduced to
pay for fees and expenses. Agreement ¶ 90 (DE 182-2); Selbin Decl. ¶ 43. Nor is
approval of the Settlement itself conditioned on the Court awarding the requested
fee -- in the event the Court approves the Settlement but declines to award Class
counsel’s attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount requested by Class counsel,
the Settlement shall nevertheless be effective and binding on the Parties.
Agreement ¶ 90 (DE 182-2); Selbin Decl. ¶ 44.
Class Representatives’ Stipends
The parties agreed that Class counsel would petition the Court for $5,000
stipends for each of the Class Representatives, to be paid by MBUSA in addition to
the relief to which each Class Representative is entitled as a Class member and on
top of the relief to the Class. Agreement ¶¶ 97-98. (DE 182-2).4 That request is
The stipends will compensate the Class Representatives for the considerable
time and effort they expended in prosecuting this case against MBUSA. Selbin
Decl. ¶ 45. In addition to the discovery-related efforts outlined above, each Class
Representative was kept informed of the litigation as it developed, and all were
kept abreast of, and signed off on, the proposed Settlement. Selbin Decl. ¶ 46, Ex.
H (Class Representative Declarations). Had Settlement not occurred, each named
Plaintiff was prepared to participate in the litigation in whatever capacity
necessary, including by testifying at trial. Selbin Decl. ¶ 47.
Preliminary Approval and Settlement Notice
On May 3, 2011, Plaintiffs submitted an unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of the Settlement. (DE 182). This Court granted preliminary approval in
an order dated May 10, 2011. (DE 184). Thereafter, individual Settlement Notice
4 The 12 Class Representatives who will receive a $5,000 stipend if this motion is granted are Leroy Browning, James Giotis, Richard Hankins, Jack D. Kelley,
was distributed to the Class according the plan adopted by the parties in the
Settlement Agreement and approved by this Court’s Order granting preliminary
Declaration of Katie Horton ¶¶ 2-3.5
CLASS COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IS WELL SUPPORTED
Courts in the Third Circuit assess attorneys’ fees in class cases in one of two
ways: the “percentage-of-recovery” method, or the “lodestar-multiplier” method.
See In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.
, 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005). “The former
applies a certain percentage to the [settlement] fund. The latter multiplies the
number of hours class counsel worked on a case by a reasonable hourly billing rate
for such services.” In re Diet Drugs
, 582 F.3d 524, 540 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also In re AT&T Corp. Secs. Litig.
F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006); McCoy v. Health Net, Inc.
, 569 F. Supp. 2d 448, 475
While courts have typically applied the percentage-of-recovery method of
assessing fees in cases with an established common fund, see
, In re Rite Aid
396 F.3d at 306-07, the lodestar method takes on greater significance in cases like
Karen Marcus, Cristian Andrew Pellegrini, Mark Russell, Ashish Sen, Colleen Sen, Michael Leslie Shim, Lois A. Martin (formerly Stowers), and Susan Tuteur.
5 Plaintiffs address the parties’ compliance with the Court-approved Notice plan in their motion for final settlement approval.
this one, where the amount of relief distributed through a settlement depends in
significant part upon the number of Class members that submit claims. See
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am.
, 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 593 (D.N.J. 2010) (“[I]f the
settlement’s value is certain, the Court can use the percentage-of-recovery method
to calculate attorneys’ fees, but if the value is too uncertain, then the Court must
use the lodestar method.”); see also In re Schering-Plough/Merck Merger Litig.,
No. 09-cv-1099, 2010 WL 1257722, at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010) (noting that
existence of complexities in valuation of settlement supports use of lodestar
As the Third Circuit has explained, the lodestar method “allows courts to
reward counsel for undertaking socially beneficial litigation” where the
percentage-of-recovery method “would provide inadequate compensation, or in
cases where the nature of the recovery does not allow the determination of the
settlement’s value required for application of the percentage-of-recovery method.”
In re Rite Aid
, 396 F.3d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).6
Regardless of the method used to assess fees, courts are to use their
discretion in considering factors that are “useful and relevant with respect to the
particular facts of the case.” In re AT&T Corp.
, 455 F.3d at 166. The requested
6 Use of the lodestar method in this case is also consistent with the fact that attorneys’ fees will be assessed against MBUSA without reducing the relief available to the Class.
amount of $6,250,000 to compensate Class counsel for their time and expenses is
exceedingly fair, modest, and reasonable in light of counsel’s significant and
successful efforts throughout this litigation.
Class Counsel’s Lodestar Shows that the Requested Fee is Fair
The lodestar method “provides an objective basis on which to make an
initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” Hensley v. Eckerhart
U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Counsel’s lodestar is “presumptively reasonable” where it
arises from a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours. Planned
Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
297 F.3d 253, 265 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2002). However, courts are to exclude
consideration of hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”
Once the lodestar amount has been determined through review of the
reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate and recorded time, courts have discretion
to adjust the fee up or down, based on a variety of factors, including:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly
, 195 Fed. Appx. 93, 96 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citing Hensley
, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3 (1983); Public
Interest Research Group v. Windall
, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Furthermore, where there has been a class settlement, the lodestar “is usually
multiplied by a factor to reflect the degree of success, the risk of non-payment the
attorneys faced and perhaps the delay in payment that they encountered.” Brown v.
Esmor Corr. Servs.
, No. 98-cv-1282, 2005 WL 1917869, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 10,
2005); see also In Re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions
148 F.3d 283, 340 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Multipliers may reflect the risks of
nonrecovery facing counsel, may serve as an incentive for counsel to undertake
socially beneficial litigation, or may reward counsel for an extraordinary result.”).
For purposes of this motion, Class counsel are submitting only the time and
costs of the four firms serving as co-lead and liaison counsel in the MDL. To date,
the combined lodestar for those four firms is $3,863,619. Selbin Decl. ¶ 64.
Counsel have agreed not to seek separate reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses currently amounting to approximately $493,787 for co-lead and liaison
counsel, and will instead reimburse costs from the requested $6,250,000 amount.
Selbin Decl. ¶ 65. Not included in these numbers is the roughly $2.36 million in
lodestar associated with the substantial work performed by other Plaintiffs’
counsel, or the almost $299,000 in costs incurred by other Plaintiffs’ counsel.
Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates Are Reasonable
“In general, a reasonable fee is one which is adequate to attract competent
counsel, but which do[es] not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Pub. Interest
Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall
, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). In assessing the
reasonableness of an attorney’s hourly rate, courts consider the prevailing market
rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience, and reputation. Barkouras v. Hecker
, No. 06-cv-0366, 2007 WL
1797651, at *3-*4 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (citing Blum v. Stenson
, 465 U.S. 886,
In this case, co-lead Class counsel are highly regarded members of the bar
who are among the most experienced in the country in the field of consumer class
actions and complex class action litigation. See
Selbin Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A; Gibbs
Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A ; Cecchi Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. C. This Court itself recognized in its April
7 Though the requested fees and expenses are based only on the work performed by co-lead and liaison counsel, other Plaintiffs’ counsel will nonetheless receive a portion of the fee and cost award, to be allocated by co-lead counsel, see
Agreement ¶ 92 (DE 182-2), based upon co-lead counsel’s assessment of the work performed by each firm and the benefits to the Class from it. Selbin Decl. ¶ 70.
27, 2009 Class Certification Order that Class counsel who negotiated the
Settlement Agreement are “sufficiently qualified and experienced to conduct the
litigation[,] . . . have ably handled the proceedings thus far, and MBUSA has not
objected to their qualifications.” (DE 105 at 51).
Furthermore, co-lead Class counsel’s customary rates, which were used for
purposes of calculating lodestar here, have been approved by numerous federal
courts in districts with similar or lower prevailing fee structures relative to this
Selbin Decl. ¶ 55, Exs. C, D and E; see also Lonardo v. Travelers
, 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 794 (N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Lawnmower Engine
Horsepower Marketing & Sales Pracs Litig.
, MDL No. 08-1999, slip op. 380, at 28
Accordingly, Class counsel submit that their hourly rates are reasonable and
The Number of Hours Class Counsel Worked Is Reasonable
The number of hours Class counsel have recorded is also reasonable. Class
counsel have devoted considerable effort to the challenging work presented by this
litigation over the course of four years. As detailed above, Class counsel’s efforts
include but are not limited to: (1) investigating and filing the action; (2) defeating a
8 As noted, only two Class members have objected to the request for fees and costs thus far. Selbin Decl. ¶ 49. Class counsel will address all fee objections, and any
motion to dismiss; (3) reviewing extensive written discovery; (4) working with
experts to prepare multiple reports; (5) deposing multiple MBUSA employees and
experts; (6) preparing Class Representatives and experts for depositions and
defending those depositions; (7) working with Class Representatives to produce
written discovery and respond to hundreds of interrogatories; (8) successfully
seeking certification of a nationwide Class; (9) defeating multiple motions and
petitions aimed at reversing Class certification; (10) obtaining data from MBUSA
necessary to develop a reliable Class list; and (11) engaging in multiple sessions of
intensely contested mediation regarding settlement. Selbin Decl. ¶¶ 10; Gibbs
Counsel’s responsibilities will not end with final approval. Co-lead Class
counsel will remain available to answer any Class member inquiries and to work
with MBUSA and the Settlement Administrator to remedy any issues that may
arise with respect to this Settlement. Selbin Decl. ¶ 60. Prior experience indicates
that this ongoing work will add significant time to the work Class counsel and their
staff have performed in this case. Selbin Decl. ¶ 60.
Moreover, co-lead Class counsel developed a litigation plan early in this
case through which they divided the primary litigation responsibilities, allowing
made to the stipends, in their reply to be filed after the objection period ends on July 19, 2011.
them to prosecute this case jointly while preventing inefficiency and duplication of
effort. Selbin Decl. ¶ 62. Thus, Lieff Cabraser took the lead on motion practice,
which included multiple rounds of briefing on both class certification and choice of
law issues as well as two appeals, while Girard Gibbs took the lead on all
discovery related activities and Carella Byrne supported both. Selbin Decl. ¶ 63.
If primary responsibilities overlapped, counsel allocated responsibility and worked
to ensure that they were working toward a common goal and not duplicating each
other’s efforts. Selbin Decl. ¶ 63. Co-lead counsel also assigned discrete tasks to
other plaintiffs’ firms, which further allowed Plaintiffs to prosecute this matter as
efficiently and expeditiously as possible. Selbin Decl. ¶ 63.
Accordingly, Class counsel respectfully submit that the hours recorded in
this case, as reflected in the supporting documentation attached to this motion, are
Selbin Decl. ¶ 52, Ex. B; Gibbs Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C; Cecchi Decl. ¶ 3,
Additional Considerations Relevant to Attorneys’ Fees
Support the Modest Lodestar Multiplier Here
This Circuit has recognized that lodestar multipliers from one to four “are
frequently awarded” in class cases. In re Prudential Ins. Co.
, 148 F.3d 283, 341
(3d Cir. 1998) (citing 3 Herbert Newberg & Albert Conte, Newberg on Class
Actions, § 14.03 at 14-5 (3d ed. 1992)); see also In re Cendent Corp. PRIDES
, 243 F.3d 772, 735-36 (3d Cir. 2001) (multiplier of 3 used even where case
“was neither legally nor factually complex,” there was a “minimal amount of
motion practice,” and where the parties submitted a settlement agreement within
four months of the filing date); In re Merck & Co., Inc. Vytorin ERISA Litig
08-cv-285, 2010 WL 547613, at *13 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2010) (approving lodestar
After reducing the requested fee of $6,250,000 by $493,787 in costs incurred
by lead and liaison counsel, the resulting amount in fees is $5,756,213. That
represents an extremely modest multiplier of less than 1.5 from the reported
$3,863,619 lodestar amount to date for co-lead and liaison counsel, which is
entirely in-line with the case law cited above. Selbin Decl. ¶ 68. The multiplier
necessarily lowers a great deal further if the work performed by all Plaintiffs
counsel, not just the work performed by co-lead and liaison counsel, is included.
A review of additional factors relevant to the reasonableness of attorneys’
fees more than supports the low multiplier here.
The Novelty and Difficulty Of The Questions Involved
and the Time and Labor Required
This case has posed particular risks for Class counsel, as evidenced by the
dismissal of other cases based on the same or similar underlying facts, see
Morris v. Mercedes-Benz USA
, No. L-259207 (Law Div., Bergen Co.); Morris v.
ADT Sec. Servs.,
No. 07-cv-809 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2009), and in light of
MBUSA’s demonstrated intention to litigate the case to the fullest extent the law
allows in the event that the litigation proceeds. Selbin Decl. ¶ 37. While Class
counsel believes a jury would have found in favor of the Class on the merits, that
outcome was by no means guaranteed. Selbin Decl. ¶ 38.
The complexity of the legal issues involved in this case and the duration of
the litigation have also contributed to extensive time and labor on Class counsel’s
part. Where the time counsel has spent on a case is significant, courts favor
awarding the requested fee. See In re Remeron Dir. Purchaser Antitrust Litig.
2005 WL 3008808, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005) (noting intense litigation and
several rounds of legal briefing); In re Rite Aid
, 396 F.3d at 305 (complexity and
duration of litigation favored significant award where litigation lasted several years
and settlement was reached only through mediation); Vytorin
, 2010 WL 547613, at
*10 (“[M]ulti-district class action litigation is inherently complex, involving
classes of persons from multiple states and consolidation of cases from multiple
The Contingent Nature Of This Case
From the outset of the case to the present, prosecution of this action has
involved financial risk for Class counsel. Class counsel prosecuted this matter on a
wholly contingent basis, which placed at risk their own resources, with no
guarantee of recovery. Selbin Decl. ¶ 61. There was no guarantee that Plaintiffs
would succeed in further motion practice, at trial, or on appeal. MBUSA has at no
time conceded liability, the appropriateness of class certification, the availability of
damages, or the proper measure thereof. Selbin Decl. ¶¶ 36, 37, 38. In short, since
the beginning of this litigation, recovery by Plaintiffs was far from assured.
Despite such challenges, Class counsel succeeded in reaching a Settlement in
which MBUSA will provide immediate and significant relief to the Class.
Class counsel have spent significant time and resources to prosecute the case
successfully on behalf of the Class, and will continue to assist the Class until the
conclusion of the claims process. Selbin Decl. ¶ 60. Counsel’s willingness to take
this risk weighs in favor of a finding that Counsel’s requested fees are reasonable.
The Experience, Reputation, And Ability Of The
The reputation, experience, and ability of Class counsel were essential to
success in this litigation. See
., In re Rite Aid
, 396 F.3d at 304 (noting that skill
of counsel resulted in significant cash relief for class). As explained more fully in
the attached declarations, Class counsel have substantial experience in consumer
class action litigation. See
Selbin Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A ; Gibbs Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A; Cecchi
Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. C; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A. Class counsel’s skill in navigating
significant and complex motions practice and in mediating this dispute before
professional mediators was essential to achieving this Settlement.
Class counsel’s history of aggressive and successful prosecution of
nationwide consumer class actions made credible their commitment to pursue this
litigation until MBUSA provided a fair result for the Class members. Through
their skill, reputation, and ability, Class counsel were able to obtain a settlement
that provides an outstanding result for the Class; one that likely could not have
been achieved by less experienced or less capable counsel.
Awards in Similar Cases
The fee awards in other settlements involving Mercedes vehicles underscore
the reasonableness of the requested fee in this case. In one recent settlement, for
example, the lodestar multiplier was 1.25 where there was no
active litigation and
class certification had not yet been briefed, much less granted and upheld against
challenge repeatedly. See
Fee Approval Order, Marsikyan et al. v. Mercedes-Benz
, 08-cv-4876 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2010), attached as Exhibit G to Selbin
Declaration. In light of Class counsel’s significantly greater efforts in this case, the
multiplier of less than 1.5 is appropriate here.
Two other prior class settlements entered into by MBUSA also bear further
discussion. O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc.
, 214 F.R.D. 266 (E.D. Pa. 2003),
involved a contested attorneys’ fee petition in the context of a class action
settlement in a case over allegedly defective vehicles, and the court awarded a 2.95
multiplier on class counsel’s claimed lodestar, plus costs of $159,312.37, all paid
separately by MBUSA. Id.
at 310-11. The case was litigated from start to finish
in 16 months. Unlike this case, in O’Keefe
, as the court noted, “the parties agree
that they are a long way from being prepared to try the case [as] [e]xtensive
discovery, interrogatories and depositions were left undone.” Id.
Moreover, unlike here, that litigation was mostly “routine” and both motion
practice and briefing were “especially light.” Id.
Applying the same multiplier
here that the Court applied in O’Keefe
results in a fee that is significantly greater
v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.
, 899 F.Supp. 1297 (D.N.J.
1995), is another, older, class settlement involving allegedly defective vehicles.
There, the Court awarded class counsel a fee of $11.25 million paid by MBUSA in
addition to class relief. Id.
at 1304. While the opinion does not report the lodestar
or multiplier applied, it does indicate that the case went from filing to settlement in
2 years, that a motion to dismiss was denied, and a motion for class certification
was granted. Whatever lodestar class counsel incurred in that case, it surely did
not reach, much less exceed, that expended here. Assuming for the sake of
argument it was $5 million, the multiplier applied to reach $11.25 million was
2.25; in all likelihood it was considerably higher.
The Requested Fee is a Reasonable Percentage of the Projected
The percentage-of-recovery method of assessing attorneys’ fees allows
courts to approve fees “in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes
it for failure.” In re Rite Aid
, 396 F.3d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When determining the appropriate percentage of recovery for class counsel,
courts look to seven factors, known as the Gunter
factors: (1) the size of the fund
created and the number of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of
substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees
requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the
complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the
amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs’ counsel; and (7) the awards in
similar cases. In re Rite Aid
, 396 F.3d at
301 (citing Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy
., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Vytorin
, 2010 WL 547613,
The Third Circuit has indicated that fee awards generally range from 19% to
45%. In re GMC Pickup Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig
., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir.
1995). The starting point, or benchmark, in the Third Circuit is 25%, with an
adjustment upward or downward depending on the facts of particular case. Paul,
Johnson, Alton & Hunt v. Graulty
, 886 F.2d 268, 273 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
, 2010 WL 547613, at *9 (approving fee of 33 1/3% of settlement, or
$13,819,500, at a lodestar-multiplier of 2.78); In re Rite Aid
, 396 F.3d at 300, 303
(noting that fee amounting to 25% of $126.6 million settlement does not exceed
fee percentages in similar cases); McGee v. Cont. Tire N. America, Inc
., No. 06-cv-
6234, 2009 WL 539893, at *16 (D.N.J. March 04, 2009) (case went from filing to
settlement in two years and only contested motion was motion to dismiss; court
approved fee of 21-32% of the value of settlement, at multiplier of 2.6 ).
Class counsel retained an expert to value the relief provided to the Class
under the Settlement. Selbin Decl. ¶ 29. Using the most conservative
methodology employed by the expert, which assigns zero value to the certificates
for purchase of new Mercedes vehicles, the total settlement value is $24,593,800.
Selbin Decl. ¶ 71. Valuing the deal under two alternative methodologies that
afford some value to the certificates (but, importantly, do not assign anything close
to 100% face value) and make different assumptions about how Group 2 Class
members behave, results in total valuations of $34,227,925 and $49,626,408.
Even if the Court were to employ the most conservative method of valuing
the Settlement, resulting in the lowest possible Settlement value, the requested fee
(excluding costs) would amount to roughly 23% of the Settlement, which is
directly in-line with the benchmark employed in this Circuit and others. Selbin
Decl. ¶ 71. In hard-fought cases like this, which are also not “mega-fund” cases
(in which the percentages tend to decline), courts routinely award well above that
benchmark. For example, in Vytorin
, the court awarded 33.3% in fees.
Accordingly, to the extent it is possible to ascertain what percentage of the
Settlement recovery the requested fee amounts to, that effort confirms the
Class Counsel’s Recorded Costs are Reasonable
There is little question that “[c]ounsel for a class action is entitled to
reimbursement of expenses that were adequately documented and reasonably and
appropriately incurred in the prosecution of the class action.” Careccio v. BMW of
N. Am. LLC
, Case No. 08-2619, 2010 WL 1752347, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2010)
(quoting In re Safety Components Int'l Sec. Litig.
, 166 F. Supp. 2d 72, 108 (D.N.J.
2001)); see also McCoy,
569 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
Though Class counsel do not seek an award of costs in addition to the
requested $6.25 million in fees, they have provided an accounting of the
reasonable costs incurred by co-lead and liaison counsel totaling approximately
$493,787. Selbin Decl. ¶ 58 , Ex. F; Gibbs Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B; Cecchi Decl. ¶ 6, Ex.
B; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B. That amount does not consider the almost
$299,000 in additional costs incurred by other Plaintiffs’ counsel that have not
been appointed lead or liaison counsel in the Class proceedings. Selbin Decl. ¶ 69.
The biggest litigation expense for Plaintiffs was to retain the three experts needed
for successful litigation of the case. Selbin Decl. ¶ 66. Those experts produced
reports related to consumer expectations, the history of the digital-to-analog
transition, and damages. Selbin Decl. ¶ 66. Additional modest litigation expenses
Class counsel incurred in this case include the following: (1) copying, mailing,
and messenger expenses; (2) computer research expenses; and (3) travel expenses.
Selbin Decl. ¶ 67, Ex. F; Gibbs Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B; Cecchi Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B;
Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B. Class counsel put forward these necessary out-of-
pocket costs without assurance that they would ever be repaid.
Class counsel worked hard to bring this case to a successful resolution in the
face of a vigorous defense, and the requested fee and costs amount is more than
fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
THE REQUESTED CLASS REPRESENTATIVE STIPENDS ARE
Stipends for class representatives promote the public policy of encouraging
individuals to undertake the responsibility of representative lawsuits. It is clear
that “[c]ourts have ample authority to award incentive or ‘service’ payments to
particular class members where the individual provided a benefit to the class or
incurred risks during the course of litigation.” Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc.
No. 09-1248, 2011 WL 1344745, at *23 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2011) (collecting cases).
Plaintiffs’ efforts were instrumental in achieving the Settlement on behalf of
the Class and justify the stipends requested here. Throughout the litigation,
Plaintiffs have performed numerous tasks, including: (1) assisting counsel with the
preparation of the relevant complaints; (2) responding to discovery requests; (3)
sitting for depositions; (4) staying abreast of the settlement negotiations; (5)
reviewing and approving the settlement terms; and (6) preparing and submitting
declarations to the Court. Selbin Decl. ¶ 46, Ex H. Plaintiffs have also committed
to providing testimony at trial should that become necessary. A $5,000 stipend for
each of the named Plaintiffs is modest under the circumstances, and well in line
with awards approved by federal courts in New Jersey and elsewhere. See
Godshall v. Franklin Mint Co.
, No. 01-cv-6539, 2004 WL 2745890, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 1, 2004) (granting special award of $20,000 to each named plaintiff for
their work as class representatives); cf. McCoy
, 569 F. Supp. 2d at 479-80 (finding
incentive payments of $60,000 to each plaintiff appropriate when the named
plaintiffs “sacrificed personal and medical privacy for the good of the class”).
The stipends in this case are particularly uncontroversial, as they do not
reduce the recovery of other Class members, and they are not opposed by MBUSA.
See In re LG/Zenith Rear Projection TV Class Action Litig.,
No. 06-cv-5609, 2009
WL 455513, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2009) (approving incentive award that “will not
decrease the recovery of other class members”). It is also significant that no Class
member has objected to the stipends. See Godshall
, 2004 WL 2745890, at *6
(noting lack of Class member objections to incentive awards).
In light of Plaintiffs’ effort and risk undertaken to obtain a meaningful result
for the Class, Plaintiffs request that the Court approve the stipends of $5,000 for
For the reasons stated above, Class counsel respectfully request that this
Court award Class counsel $6,250,000 in fees and costs, and award 12 stipends of
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO
Co-Lead and Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class
Inhibitory Effect of Terbinafine on Reactive Oxygen Species (ROS) Generation by Candida albicansU-C. Hipler1, Ch. Schroeter1, U. Wollina1, B. Hipler21Department of Dermatology and Allergology, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany; 2BMG LABTECH, Germany1x109 cells/mL were prepared in saline and YEPG medium. Candida cells at a concentration of 1x108 cells/mL were incubated in s
LEY DE CIUDADANÍA ARGENTINA Ley 26.774 Modifícanse Leyes N° 346, 17.671, 19.945, 23.298, 25.432, 26.215 y 26.571. El Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina reunidos en Congreso, ARTICULO 1° — Modifícase el artículo 7° de la ley 346, que quedará redactado de Artículo 7°: Los argentinos que hubiesen cumplido la edad de dieciséis (16) años, gozan de todo