Dept.econ.yorku.ca

policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is (as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is (as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is (as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B income y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is (as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is (as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is (as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ] so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ) this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ] so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ) this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ) this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ] parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ) this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ] so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ) this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ] so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ] so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ) so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other) so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δ the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if parties know about these biases ; each party knows, forexample, that 1/4 of all the voters of income y J have a bias infavour of party B of 1 or more for each income level y J , these biases σiJ are uniformlydistributed over some interval for each income level y J , these biases σiJ are uniformlydistributed over some interval parties know about these biases ; each party knows, forexample, that 1/4 of all the voters of income y J have a bias infavour of party B of 1 or more everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties : everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties : everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties : the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties : everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties : everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A if a fraction αJ of the voters have an income y J (and thesevoters vary in their biases), and party A gets a share 1 + σJ φJ of those voters’ votes, then equation (2) implies that party A’soverall vote is party A wins if this share is greater than 1 , which will happen if party A wins if this share is greater than 1 , which will happen if if a fraction αJ of the voters have an income y J (and thesevoters vary in their biases), and party A gets a share 1 + σJ φJ of those voters’ votes, then equation implies that party A’soverall vote is if a fraction αJ of the voters have an income y J (and thesevoters vary in their biases), and party A gets a share 1 + σJ φJ of those voters’ votes, then equation implies that party A’soverall vote is party A wins if this share is greater than 1 , which will happen if so that equation (5) says that party A’s probability of winning is where φ is the average value of the φJ ’s : the probability that the popularity parameter δ is less than x is the probability that the popularity parameter δ is less than x is so that equation says that party A’s probability of winning is where φ is the average value of the φJ ’s : party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression (7) taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival choose a policy gA to maximize expression (7) taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival party A wants to maximize its chance of winning taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gBso that it chooses gB so as to maximize as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gB as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gBso that it chooses gB so as to maximize party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gBso that it chooses gB so as to maximize as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium the policy each party chooses — the solution to (8) [or (10)] maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests means “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups

Source: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~sam/4380/parties/prob.pdf